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Abstract: The European union (Eu) is the most generous donor 
of international development cooperation—it transfers more than 
a half of the world’s Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA). In 
fact, the Eu development policy is depending on three major 
contributors: france, Germany and the united Kingdom (uK), 
which are also among the top countries making the largest transfers 
to development cooperation. However, special attention should 
be paid to the uK, belonging to the avant-garde of international 
development cooperation. The united Kingdom is not only a part of 
the Eu assistance wallet but also an important partner in shaping 
the development policy. This article attempts to answer the 
main research question: what impact will Brexit have on the Eu 
development policy? The analysis covers the political plane, and 
the following elements will be taken into consideration: the impact 
of the uK’s withdrawal from the organisation on shaping the Eu 
development policy (its geographical and thematic concentration), 
and the ability to fulfi l development commitments, which 
were undertaken by the Member States and the organisation. 
Consequently, Brexit may lead to reshaping the Eu partnership 
with the African, Caribbean and Pacifi c Group of States (ACP), as 
well as undermine the Eu’s ability to meet its obligations in the 
development area.
Keywords: Brexit, development aid, EU development cooperation, 
EU development policy, the United Kingdom
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1. The impact of Brexit on the Eu development policy. 
Selected political issues
The European Union (EU) is the most generous donor of international 
development cooperation—it transfers more than a half of the world’s Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). In each year of the 21st century, it financed 
from 44.41% (in 2014) to 52.99% (2001) of total aid transfers, and in recent 
years it was: 50.99% (2015), 52.03% (2016), 51.82% (2017), and 52.63% (2018) 
of global ODA (OECD, 2019a). In this field of activity, the organisation relies 
in particular on the strength of its Member States, since they finance the 
vast majority of instruments through which the EU implements development 
cooperation, and also participate in bilateral and other multilateral aid. The 
sum of their efforts, thanks to parallel competences in this area (TFEU, 
2012, Art. 4, 208), guarantees the EU a leading position in development 
assistance. In fact, the EU ODA is depending on three major contributors: 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), which are also among the 
top countries making the largest transfers to development cooperation. Since 
2014, they have been financing over 60% of EU assistance. 
However, special attention should be paid to the UK. Over the past 
two decades, the state has systematically increased its involvement in 
international ODA, transferring from over 5.3 bn US dollars (2000) to over 
18.4 bn US dollars (2018) per year. Thanks to this, the percentage share of 
the UK in total development assistance also increased—from 7.19% in 2000 
to 11.67% in 2018. This allowed London to be the fifth largest global donor in 
2000–2007, and then to be promoted to the third position (after the United 
States and Germany) (OECD, 2019a). Until now, the EU has also benefited 
from the United Kingdom’s interest in development cooperation by financing 
its activities in two main ways: from its general budget (the section devoted 
to external actions) and the European Development Fund (EDF). So far, 
the UK (being one of 28 countries) has financed the general budget of the 
EU in one-tenth (European Commission, 2018), and the last two editions 
of EDF—in nearly 15% each (Internal agreement, 2006; 2013). This means 
that after London’s withdrawal from the EU, the organisation’s budget for 
ODA may be significantly reduced in proportion to the gap that Brexit will 
create (Olivié & Pérez, 2017). On the other hand, the EU will remain the 
most generous ODA donor in the world, but without the UK’s shares it will 
no longer provide over a half of the aid, but just over 40%. However, it is 
worth noting that the UK is not only a very rich part of the EU development 
cooperation wallet but also an important partner in its implementation. 
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Therefore, Brexit will bring not only financial but also political consequences 
for the EU development policy. 
Thus, this article attempts to answer the main research question: what impact 
will Brexit have on the EU development policy? The analysis will cover the 
political plane, and the following elements will be taken into consideration: 
the impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the organisation on shaping the 
EU development policy, and the ability to fulfil development commitments 
which were undertaken by the Member States and the organisation. In view 
of this research problem, it is necessary to formulate additional questions: 
What influences the shape of the EU development cooperation, primarily its 
geographical and sectoral (thematic) concentration, and what development 
commitments has the EU made and how are they fulfilled? In this context, 
I take into account the fact of finalisation of Brexit, irrespectively of its 
final option. I do not consider the Brexit variants, because regardless of 
whether it will be based on the existing withdrawal agreement (Agreement 
2019/C 144 I/01), a revised arrangement or a no-deal version, development 
cooperation is not the priority of exit negotiations. 
The study was based mainly on an analysis of content and documents 
regulating the EU’s development cooperation and on an analysis of 
statistical data on the EU and the UK ODA. It is worth noting that the EU 
development assistance in the debate about the anticipated effects of Brexit 
is not a priority issue, especially in the context of political consequences. 
2. Brexit and designing the Eu development policy
The United Kingdom is not only one of the financial pillars of the EU 
development policy but also plays an important role in shaping the 
organisation’s development cooperation strategy, including its sectoral 
(thematic) and geographical concentration. However, in the 21st century, 
the impact of individual members on the EU ODA programmes is limited—
primarily due to implementation of globally set priorities. Firstly, the 
international agreement of the United Nations (the Millennium Declaration) 
set out eight Millennium Development Goals to be achieved in 2000–2015 
(UN, 2000), and the Agenda 2030 identified another seventeen Sustainable 
Development Goals (UN, 2015a). Among them were overarching tasks, 
related to the reduction and final elimination of poverty, preventing hunger 
and malnutrition, improving health care, increasing access to education, 
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promoting the protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law or 
environmental protection. 
Meanwhile, it is worth paying attention to the fact that reducing, and 
ultimately eradicating, poverty became the main goal of development 
cooperation conducted by the EU only under the Lisbon Treaty (Consolidated 
version of the TFEU, 2012, Art. 208), and earlier such a provision was 
proposed by the un-ratified Constitution for Europe (Treaty…, 2004, Art. 
III-316). By gaining legitimacy in the Maastricht Treaty, development 
cooperation was primarily to foster “the sustainable economic and social 
development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most 
disadvantaged among them; the smooth and gradual integration of the 
developing countries into the world economy; the campaign against poverty 
in the developing countries” (Treaty…, 1992, Art. 130u). Such shaping of 
development assistance priorities resulted from its genesis, reaching back 
to the association of Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) under the 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. On the one 
hand, the partnership was to serve the development of these areas, but on 
the other—to establish and strengthen close economic relations between 
them and the Community. The accession of the United Kingdom has led 
to a reorientation of priorities in this area, paying more attention to the 
least developed countries (LDCs) in the world (however, this was also partly 
motivated by the national interest, especially related to strengthening the 
Commonwealth). Moreover, the UK was and is seen as an active member of 
the international community, playing a leading role in shaping the global 
development agenda (OECD, 2014), concentrated on poverty reduction 
(as indicated in the British International Development Act of 2002), and 
effectively realising actions in this field (HM Government, 2005, p. 26; Bond, 
2019, pp. 12–16). The focus of the UK’s assistance on poverty reduction may 
be proved by statistics in ODA spending in LDCs, where it is a priority 
activity. For example, since 2010, the United Kingdom has allocated 
significantly more to this sector than the other two major contributors of 
the EU development cooperation, Germany and France (Fig. 1). 
In this context, especially on the UK’s side, concerns arise whether Brexit 
will affect the EU development cooperation—despite global commitments 
and agendas—like turning again towards pursuing the organisation’s own, 
mainly economic, interests. It was London that initiated many of the actions 
targeted at LDCs. Simon Maxwell, the former director of the European Think 
Tanks Group, believes that “If we are not there [in the EU], the European 
programme will be less poverty-focused than it is likely to be if we are. We 
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have been a force for the argument for poverty reduction” (Corrected oral 
evidence, 2018). In fact, the UK sees itself as a main force in focusing the 
EU development assistance on poverty eradication (DFID, 2009, p. 111). Yet, 
this issue is particularly important, as the UK’s promotion of this orientation 
in ODA at the EU forum was consequently confirmed by the international 
community, inter alia, by the OECD. For example, the OECD already 
in 2001 emphasised that “DFID [the UK’s Department for International 
Development] has been advocating that the EC [the European Community] 
increase its focus on poorer countries” (OECD, 2001, p. 31), and in 2006, 
in turn, noted that “the UK development priority of its EU presidency [in 
2005] has notably been to secure decisions related to poverty reduction, HIV/
AIDS, development in Africa and revision of the EC’s Development Policy 
to improve aid effectiveness” (OECD, 2006, p. 35). The UK’s development 
actions in the following years met with a similar OECD’s assessment. At 
the dawn of a new decade, in the context of the EU, “the UK has played a 
key role in arguing for a continued international focus on poverty reduction, 
despite the recent economic and financial turbulence” (OECD, 2010, p. 25), 
while in 2014, due to the UK’s efforts in aligning European trade policies 
with development aims, “important contributions to making trade systems 
work better for poor countries” were appreciated (OECD, 2014, p. 25). 
Figure 1. distribution of net odA to Least developed Countries by 
the united Kingdom, Germany and france in 2010–2017
data source: oECd, 2019b
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The aforementioned post-2015 agenda also recommended that 0.15–0.2% of 
GNI on ODA should be directed to the LDCs group (UN CDP, 2018), and that 
0.7% of GNI should be transferred to developing countries, which somehow 
indicated the geographical target of development activities. Nevertheless, 
shaping of the geographical concentration of the EU development cooperation 
was also affected by the UK’s accession to the organisation. Considering 
the fact that colonial powers dominated among the Communities’ founding 
countries, identifying their political, economic and social interest in various 
regions of the world, it was not surprising that the OCTs association firstly 
embraced countries and non-European territories, maintaining special 
relations with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Most of them 
were located in Africa.1 
The accession of the United Kingdom in 1973 resulted in a significant 
enlargement of the group of associated overseas and territories, as well as 
the extension of the association’s scope beyond Africa.2 Shortly thereafter (in 
1975), the involvement of areas related to the UK led to the signing of the 
first Lomé Convention, regulating the relations between the Communities 
and OCTs, which have since formed the ACP group (African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific Group of States) (Prince, 2016, pp. 500 –502). In this way, the United 
Kingdom influenced the diversification of the geographical concentration of 
development assistance provided by the Communities. Importantly, the ACP 
countries (also due to the Cotonou Agreement) are still the main recipients 
of EU ODA. For example, from the 22.6 bn euros budget of the 10th EDF, as 
much as 21.9 bn euros was allocated to ACP states (286 mln euros for OCTs) 
(Internal agreement, 2006), while from 30.5 bn euros of the 11th EDF more 
than 29.0 bn euros was directed to ACP (364.5 mln euros for OCTs) (Internal 
agreement, 2013). 
1  French West Africa: Senegal, French Sudan, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mau-
ritania, Niger and Upper Volta; French Equatorial Africa: Central Congo, Ubagni-Shari, 
Chad and Gabon; Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Comoros, Madagascar and dependent territo-
ries, French Somalia, New Caledonia and dependent territories, French Colonies of Oceania, 
French Southern and Antarctic Territories; Autonomous Republic of Togo; trust territory of 
Cameroon under French management; Belgian Congo and Rwanda-Urundi; trust territory 
of Somalia under Italian management; New Dutch Guinea. (Traité…, 1957, Annexe IV)
2 Then: Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides, The Bahamas, Bermuda, British 
Antarctic Territory, British Honduras, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Solomon Is-
lands, British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Associated States in the Caribbean: Antigua, Domi-
nica, Grenada, St Lucia, St Vincent, St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Central and 
Southern Line Islands, Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, 
Montserrat, Pitcairn, St Helena and Dependencies, The Seychelles, Turks and Caicos Is-
lands. (Treaty…, 1972, Art. 24)
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Brexit, in this case, the cessation of the UK’s interest, may result in 
diminishing the importance of countries and territories with special 
relations with the UK (especially Caribbean and Pacific ones) in the EU 
development policy (Clegg, 2016, p. 551; Kennes, 2018, pp. 9–12). It is worth 
paying attention to this issue, even though the European Commission’s 
initial proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027 
does not confirm this concern. The new assumption of the Commission is 
to create one, more flexible tool through which activities will be carried 
out to eliminate poverty, as well as to promote sustainable development, 
prosperity, peace and stability. Therefore, the Neighbourhood, Development 
and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) is planned to combine 
funds for external actions which so far were allocated in the general budget 
of the EU and the European Development Fund. According to this proposal, 
expenditure on the implementation of development goals is going to increase 
(89.2 bn euros was initially allocated to NDICI, i.e., more than 7 bn euros than 
in total from the general budget for external activities and the 11th Fund 
in the period 2014–2020) (Proposal COM(2018) 460 final). The geographical 
distribution of funds from the 10th EDF, the 11th EDF and the designed 
NDICI is presented in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Geographical distribution of funds from the 10th Edf, 
the 11th Edf and the new ndiCi
Data source: Internal agreement, 2006; 2013; Proposal COM(2018)460 final
Nevertheless, it is highly possible that the budget of the new external 
actions instrument will be reduced. First of all, because it is the area 
most liable to cuts during negotiations on the MFF between the Member 
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States. That was reflected in the financial framework 2014–2020—from 
the European Commission’s proposal for budgeting foreign activities at 70 
bn euros remained just over 50 bn euros (Communication COM(2011)500 
final). Secondly, because the core of the ACP group is constituted by 
African countries—49 African states participate in the association, 16 are 
Caribbean, and 15 are Pacific. The superiority of sub-Saharan Africa in the 
EU’s development cooperation can be seen even in the initial NDICI budget 
proposal (as indicated above). Then, reducing the assistance directed towards 
the Caribbean and Pacific countries may be easier for the Member States 
which remain in the EU after Brexit (the UK was their most important 
“constructive ally” in any EU discussion; Byron, 2019). Moreover, greater 
emphasis on maintaining support for Africa (compared to other regions) can 
be backed up not only by the other Western European countries’ (mainly 
France’s) influence in this area but also by the fact that 33 countries from the 
47 on the UN Least Developed Countries List are located in this continent 
(UN CDP, 2018). This, in turn, would bring Member States closer to meeting 
their international obligations in the field of spending ODA. 
However, there is also a risk that LDCs will feel the effect of the UK’s exit 
from the EU the most. Depending on the final form of Brexit, restored 
barriers and trade restrictions may adversely affect some of them (especially 
in the case of no-deal withdrawal) (Coke-Hamilton, 2019). In the short term, 
lower UK demand may occur, which will reduce LDCs exports. Furthermore, 
trade and investment restrictions between the EU and the UK may have an 
impact on development. Nonetheless, in the long term, the key issue will be 
the type of the UK trade regime with developing countries affecting the UK’s 
import, as well as the economic growth in the EU and the UK, which may 
decrease due to difficulties in bilateral relations between the parties, and 
which will also indirectly affect developing countries (Mendez-Parra et al., 
2016, p. 3). In consequence, this may also result in a diminution in the EU 
support for the Caribbean and Pacific Commonwealth countries (Lightfoot 
et al., 2017, pp. 517 –524). 
On the other hand, post-Brexit relations between the UK and the 
Commonwealth may also be an important context for shaping the EU 
development cooperation. Despite political declarations (Johnson, 2018), it 
is not possible for the United Kingdom to completely replace participation 
in the EU with enhanced cooperation under the Commonwealth (Gulati, 
2019). Therefore, it is worth noting that out of 53 Commonwealth countries, 
as many as 42 are involved in the EU–ACP partnership, representing more 
than a half of the countries in this group. As well as countries maintaining 
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special relations with the UK, participating in the association may weaken 
after the UK’s withdrawal (by losing an important ally), and Brexit may 
weaken the position of the Union in negotiating the terms of the deal, which 
will be the successor to the Cotonou Agreement (because of the reshaped 
UK’s influence on the Commonwealth) (Henökl, 2018, p. 3).
3. Brexit and the Eu’s commitments to development
Another issue is questioning by Brexit the credibility of the EU in implementing 
its own commitments. One of the most important commitments in the area 
of development policy made by the EU was that arising from The European 
Consensus on Development of 2005 (which was an EU response for the 
Monterrey Consensus and MDGs action plan). Already then the organisation 
determined the desired value of ODA financed by its Member States at the 
level of 0.7% of their GNI. This goal should have been achieved by 2015 and 
preceded by the achievement of the amount of 0.56% of GNI on ODA by 
2010. At the same time, this recommendation was clarified and adapted to 
the diverse attainments of particular countries in this matter.3 Therefore, in 
2015, three goals were to be achieved: reaching a value of 0.7% of GNI on ODA 
by some countries, maintaining a value higher than 0.7% of GNI on ODA by 
some countries, accomplishing the target of 0.33% of GNI on ODA by new EU 
countries (Joint statement 2006/C 46/01). The need to provide 0.7% of GNI to 
ODA for developing countries in the second decade of the 21st century was 
also repeated by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (United Nations, 2015b, pp. 
26 –27) and another UN global strategy (the post-2015 one—the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development) (United Nations, 2015a). This commitment—
without any preferential provisions for Member States—was also upheld by 
The New European Consensus on Development of 2017. This target, according 
to the agendas, should be achieved by 2030 (Joint statement 2017/C 210/01). 
A significant fact in this context is that the implementation of this financial 
commitment was planned firstly within 10 years, and when it proved 
impossible—within the next 15 years. However, at the end of the second 
decade of the 21st century, it must be stated that achieving this goal in a 
3 States that in 2005 had not yet reached the 0.51% GNI for ODA threshold, were obliged to 
implement it by 2010, while those above this ceiling—to maintain their efforts. In turn, the 
countries that joined the EU after 2002 and which did not reach the level of 0.17% of GNI on 
ODA in 2005, were recommended to meet this financial target by 2010 (similarly, new EU 
members meeting this criterion were obliged to continue their efforts).
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quarter of a century may still prove to be too ambitious (Table 1, Annex). 
This issue quite clearly reflects, on the one hand, the differences (primarily 
economic) between the Member States, and on the other, the level of their 
attachment (or lack thereof) to development assistance. 
In 2005, the ODA threshold of 0.51% of GNI was exceeded in Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden (at the same 
time, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden already reached the 0.7% of 
GNI / ODA target). Below this level remained: Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. However, 
none of the new EU countries reached the 0.17% of GNI threshold. Among 
the countries that should reach the GNI value of 0.51% in 2010, Finland 
and Ireland succeeded, while the United Kingdom, as well as Belgium, 
Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden, exceeded the value 
of 0.56% GNI per ODA. Cyprus and Malta also donated over 0.17% of GNI to 
ODA. In turn, in 2015, the basic goal of 0.7% of GNI to ODA was achieved by 
Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, 
while none of the countries which accessed the EU after 2002 exceeded its 
0.33% GNI threshold. After ten years, a precondition of 2005 (0.51% of GNI) 
was met by Finland and Germany. The latest available data (from 2017) 
shows that ODA’s share of government expenditures above 0.7% is present 
only in Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Germany 
is relatively close to this threshold (Fig. 3) (OECD, 2019a). 
The value of Official Development Assistance provided by the UK in the 
years 2000–2017 was liable to fluctuations, but from a perspective of nearly 
two decades, it has increased significantly. Since 2013, the value of the UK’s 
ODA fluctuates around 0.7% of GNI. Therefore, according to The European 
Consensus on Development, the United Kingdom, in 2005 not exceeding the 
0.51% of GNI per ODA threshold, undertook to achieve it in 2010, but then 
it already reached the higher value, obliging more advanced in development 
assistance countries. Soon afterwards—as one of the few Member States—it 
realised the most important financial commitment of the EU development 
policy (Baker et al., 2018). 
Considering the above data, one can have doubts regarding the credibility 
of the EU Member States in fulfilling their obligations undertaken within 
the organisation (raised over time to the rank of global commitments). All 
the more, this credibility will suffer after Brexit. The United Kingdom is 
one of the few countries that has implemented the EU assumption in terms 
of spending on ODA. However, there are also doubts whether—in the face 
of economic turmoil resulting from leaving the EU—the UK itself will keep 
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its commitments (Barder, 2016). However, certainly, the implementation 
of the goals adopted by the EU (dated to 2030) will have to face the short-
term pressure arising from Brexit. Its consequence should be an increase in 
spending on ODA in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (Anderson 
& Mitchell, 2016), which is still not a foregone conclusion. 
4. Conclusions
The United Kingdom is one of the financial and political pillars of the EU 
development policy. London has strongly influenced the shape of the EU’s 
geographical and thematic interests in the field of aid. The UK’s accession 
to the EU led to the expansion of the scope of the organisation’s external 
association and allowed it to go beyond the African direction, previously 
promoted by the founding states of the Communities, because of their 
historical relationships and economic matters. The inclusion of countries 
and territories with special relations with the United Kingdom quickly led 
to the creation of the ACP group, which is still the main direction of the 
EU development cooperation. In this regard, Brexit may have the following 
effects: (1) minimising the significance of the countries that joined the group 
on the UK’s initiative in the ACP partnership; (2) re-focusing attention 
Figure 3. The Eu Member States’ expenditures on odA in 2017
(% of Gni)
data source: oECd, 2019a
14
Monika Szynol
TalTech Journal of European Studies
Tallinn university of Technology (iSSn 2674-4619), Vol. 10, no. 1 (30)
on African states with which other Member States, mainly France, have 
deeper relations, and which constitute the core of the LDCs group (African 
concentration is also declared by Germany; however, a gap in allocation to 
LDCs may still be seen in this case; OECD, 2018); (3) hindering negotiations 
of the new partnership agreement with ACP due to the fact that the majority 
of its members belong to the Commonwealth. At the same time, there are 
fears that LDCs will suffer the most from Brexit. Development aid to these 
countries may be hit, by ricochet, by the newly created barriers in economic 
relations between the EU and the UK and by the following turmoil, which 
may lead to a reduction in their economic growth. An important threat may 
also be the fact that the EU will turn towards middle-developed countries 
and territories in which poverty reduction is not the main priority, as it 
was the UK which initiated a significant part of anti-poverty activities. 
On the other hand, the concentration of the UK’s aid is also evolving. As 
indicated in the 2015 Strategy, its main objectives are: “strengthening global 
peace, security and governance; strengthening resilience and response to 
crises; promoting global prosperity; tackling extreme poverty and helping 
the world’s most vulnerable” (DFID, 2015, p. 3). While the attachment to 
pursuing the national interest is becoming more apparent in recent years 
(Krutikova & Warwick, 2017), it is harder to recognise the UK as the only 
and traditional guarantor of poverty elimination orientation in the EU. 
Further effects of Brexit may also weaken the credibility of the EU in fulfilling 
its commitments. In 2005, under The European Consensus on Development, 
the EU made a pioneering decision to transfer 0.7% of GNI to ODA. This 
level should have been achieved by members in 2015 at the latest, taking 
into account the economic diversification between the states, allowing the 
new EU countries to achieve 0.33% of GNI in this matter. This obligation 
was poorly implemented, so it was upheld in 2017 by The New European 
Consensus on Development, which was a response to the global Agenda 2030 
for Sustainable Development. Therefore, in 2015, the United Nations also 
made a commitment to provide ODA at 0.7% of GNI by 2030. Meanwhile, 
as available data indicate, among the EU Member States only Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom are fulfilling this obligation, 
and Germany, consequently increasing ODA funds, is close to achieving 
it. Other Member States (including the third pillar of the EU development 
policy—France) are still below the threshold, even those partially set in 2005. 
The level of realisation of this commitment leaves doubts as to whether they 
can be achieved even in 2030. It also shows the diverse involvement of states 
in development cooperation. Therefore, the credibility of the Union in this 
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respect will be further undermined by Brexit, as one of the few countries 
which fulfils the financial promise will cease to be a Member State. 
One may also wonder to what extent will the international position of the 
EU, which is largely based on the status of the most generous ODA donor, 
suffer because of Brexit (Kugiel, 2017, pp. 67–69). First of all, the withdrawal 
means a potential significant reduction on the ODA budget allocated by 
the EU with its Member States (Olivié & Pérez, 2018, pp. 25–26). In this 
context, Brexit may lead to a depreciation of the EU’s position in the world 
(Koenig, 2016, p. 5), because the EU will no longer donate more than a 
half of global ODA. Although, it will remain the most generous global donor 
(after deducting the UK’s spending on ODA, the EU will supply not more 
than 50% of global assistance, but just over 40%) (OECD, 2019a). So far, the 
EU has primarily attracted by its prosperity, being also a desirable partner 
for third countries. Along with Brexit, the Union’s attraction force is likely 
to decrease, and, above all, its attractiveness will be undermined (Henökl, 
2018, p. 64). It turns out that this prosperity is no longer interesting enough 
even for its Member States. Then, the question arises whether it will be 
sufficiently credible to other countries, in particular those who are partners 
and recipients of the EU assistance. Furthermore, Brexit will set a dangerous 
precedent and at the same time an argument for Eurosceptics from other 
countries and can have a spillover effect (which may also have an impact on 
the EU development cooperation). For these reasons and in the face of many 
unknowns, further research in this matter is necessary. 
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Annex
Table 1. The Eu Member States’ expenditures on odA 2000–2017 
(% of Gni)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
AT 0.23 0.34 0.25 0.20 0.23 0.52 0.47 0.50 0.43
BE 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.60 0.41 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.48
BG n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
CY n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.16
CZ 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12
DK 1.06 1.03 0.96 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.82
EE n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10
FI 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.46 0.40 0.39 0.44
FR 0.30 0.31 0.37 0.40 0.41 0.47 0.47 0.38 0.38
DE 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38
GR 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.21
HU n/a n/a n/a 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.07
IE 0.29 0.33 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.54 0.55 0.59
IT 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.29 0.20 0.19 0.22
LV n/a n/a n/a 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.60 0.07
LT n/a n/a n/a 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.11
LU 0.70 0.77 0.78 0.86 0.79 0.79 0.89 0.92 0.97
MT n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
NL 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.79 0.73 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.80
PL 0.02 0.02 n/a 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.07
PT 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.22 0.63 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.27
RO n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.09
SK 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.07 n/a 0.10 0.09 0.10
SI n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13
ES 0.22 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.31 0.37 0.45
SE 0.80 0.77 0.84 0.79 0.78 0.94 1.02 0.93 0.98
UK 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.47 0.51 0.35 0.43
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
AT 0.30 0.32 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.35 0.42 0.30
BE 0.55 0.64 0.54 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.42 0.50 0.45
BG n/a 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.11
CY 0.20 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 n/a n/a
CZ 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15
DK 0.88 0.91 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.75 0.74
EE 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.16
FI 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.59 0.55 0.44 0.42
FR 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.43
DE 0.35 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.42 0.52 0.70 0.67
GR 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.19 0.16
HU 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.11
IE 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.47 0.46 0.37 0.32 0.32 0.32
IT 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.30
LV 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10
LT 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.13
LU 1.04 1.05 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.06 0.95 1.00 1.00
MT 0.18 0.18 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.21
NL 0.82 0.81 0.75 0.71 0.67 0.63 0.75 0.65 0.60
PL 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.13
PT 0.23 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.18
RO 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.11
SK 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13
SI 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.16
ES 0.46 0.43 0.29 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.34 0.19
SE 1.12 0.97 1.02 0.95 1.01 1.09 1.40 0.94 1.02
UK 0.51 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
data source: oECd, 2019a
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